Abstract: Most philosophers of science hold that the laws of nature play an important role in determining which counterfactuals are true. Marc Lange reverses this dependence, arguing that it is the truth of certain counterfactuals that determines which statements are laws. I argue that the context sensitivity of counterfactual sentences makes it impossible for them to determine the laws. Next, I argue that Lange's view cannot avoid additional counterexamples concerning nested counterfactuals. Finally, I argue that Lange's counterfacts, posited as the ultimate ontological ground for the laws of nature, are unsuited to the role he demands of them.
Counterfactual Sentences and Context
One reason to think counterfactuals are closely bound up with the laws of nature is that the laws seem to hold 'no matter what' or 'come what may.' 1 Lange takes this to be an essential feature of the laws, and relies on it to ground the laws of nature. Lange's central principle Nomic Preservation 2 is as follows:
(NP) m is a law if and only if in any conversational context, and for any p that is relevant as a counterfactual antecedent in that context and logically consistent with all of the laws (taken together), the proposition expressed by "p m" is true. (Lange 2009, 15) .
necessary consequent (again, relative to n) in every context of w. If so, then the collection n has earned its status of lawhood, and statements m 1 , m 2 . . . are each laws of w. Lange's view is particularly striking because these counterfactuals are not merely epistmically or heuristically useful for identifying the laws of nature, they ontologically ground the laws of nature. And, according to Lange, the counterfactuals are, in turn, ontologically grounded in primitive counterfacts.
Semantics and Context
According to a traditional semantic picture, sentence types in contexts express
propositions. For example, the sentence,"You are wearing an orange shirt," in a context
where Lee is the addressee, expresses the proposition that Lee is wearing an orange shirt.
The very same sentence can express different propositions in different contexts. For example, the same sentence would express a proposition about Jones in a context where Jones is the addressee. A sentence in a context is true relative to a world, just in case the proposition expressed by the sentence in the context is true relative to that world. Lange (2009, 197) offers an example in which a patient is accidentally injected with a syringe that a male doctor mistakenly believes to contain arsenic. Assume, for the sake of the example, that there are "arsenic laws," which have as a consequence that if a normal human being takes arsenic, that person dies. Since the syringe does not, in fact, contain arsenic, the patient lives. The doctor, still believing the patient was injected with arsenic, is thrilled when the patient survives, and prepares to write up this surprising result for a journal. When the female 6 nurse discovers that the patient was not actually injected with arsenic, she says, (4) "If the doctor had given the patient arsenic, he would be famous for discovering that arsenic doesn't always kill human beings."
Prima facie, the counterfactual sentence (4) One option that suggests itself is that (4)The ProblemItem.4 expresses the proposition that:
(5*) If the doctor had given the patient arsenic and the patient had lived, then he would be famous for discovering that arsenic doesn't always kill human beings.
Indeed, this seems plausible. Semantic theories can be quite complicated, and propositions need not mirror the surface structure of the sentences that express them. 
Two Possible Responses
In the face of these considerations, Lange could develop an error theory for this kind of problematic counterfactual. Rather than arguing that sentence (4)The ProblemItem.4 is 10. There is another worry about which clauses need to be 'implicitly' included in the antecedent. Lange (2009, 197-8, endnote has too high a cost and prefers to take our intuitions about the truth or falsity of such sentences at face value. But because a standard semantics does not include any notion of "implicitly," according to which (4)The ProblemItem.4 is 'implicitly' (5)The
ProblemItem.5, appealing to such a notion won't help unless Lange can say more about it. Thus, this paper could be read as an invitation for Lange to motivate an interpretation of "implicitly" that is able do the work he envisions.
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Another way of responding to the above objection, is to give up on sentences altogether. Lange can avoid the counterexample raised above by maintaining that the sentence (4)The ProblemItem.4 is true because it expresses the counterfactual proposition (5*)The ProblemItem.6, which has an antecedent proposition that is incompatible with the laws.
Therefore, (5*)The ProblemItem.6 is no threat to (NPP).
By characterizing laws of nature in terms of propositions, Lange would avoid the objection raised above, but he would not escape a second objection that I raise for his view below.
Nested Counterfactuals
In this section, I will argue that another feature of Lange's account, namely, his theory of nested counterfactuals, admits of counterexamples as well.
Recall, Lange maintains that if p is compatible with all of the laws taken together, and m is a law, then p m. While this guarantees that m is counterfactually true, it does not guarantee that m is counterfactually a law, which is a further requirement of Lange's. (2007) and Hall (2010) , think that laws need only be true at nomologically possible worlds. If Lange gave up this feature of his view, it would avoid the objections I raise in this section, but he would have to substantially modify other aspects of his account, the details of which would take us too far afield.
Lange is happy to concede that (5)The ProblemItem.5 is true. Since it has an antecedent that contradicts the 'arsenic laws,' it is no threat to his theory. But, suppose we modify it by turning it into the following nested counterfactual:
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(5') If the doctor had given the patient arsenic, then if the patient had lived, then the doctor would be famous for discovering that arsenic doesn't always kill human beings.
(5')CounterfactsItem.14 also seems true, and if so, it is a counterexample to (NP). To see this, note that it is compatible with the laws that the doctor gives the patient arsenic, it is compatible with the laws that the patient lives, and yet the consequent is contradicted by the arsenic laws. It is easy to design a formula for producing such counterexamples. Take p and q to be jointly though not individually incompatible with some law of nature (m).
Then, in general, p (q ∼ m) will be true, and a counterexample to Lange's theory.
Consider another example:
(6) If the earth were twice as massive, then if the moon's orbit were the same as it is now, gravity (as it is now) would not hold.
The above nested counterfactual seems true, but Lange's theory requires it to be false. To defend his theory, Lange must argue that despite appearances, (6)Nested
CounterfactualsItem.9 and all other nested counterfactuals of the form p (q ∼ m) are false.
13. Note that neither Lange nor I endorses the much stronger import/export principle, according to which p (q m) is logically equivalent to (p&q) m.
Additionally, since p (q m), the only way for Lange to deny that these are counterexamples, is to say that if p were to hold, then if q were to hold, then something about p wouldn't hold (otherwise, if p held, we would have a consequent that violated m). In general, when p and q are jointly incompatible with m, Lange has to say p (q ∼ p), a very counterintuitive result indeed! Thus, the following counterfactuals, though they seem false, according to Lange's account, must be true:
(7) If the doctor had given the patient arsenic, then if the patient had lived, then the doctor would not have given the patient arsenic.
(8) If the earth were twice as massive, then if the moon's orbit were the same as it is now, the earth would not be twice as massive.
And, Lange says just that, arguing that when you say, or think about, counterfactuals such as (5')CounterfactsItem.14 or (6)Nested CounterfactualsItem.9 with the right emphasis, they do sound false. Similarly, when you say, or think about, counterfactuals such as (8)Nested CounterfactualsItem.11, they do sound true. 14 Thus, he asks us to consider the following alternative, but arguably equivalent formulations of (5')CounterfactsItem.14 and (6)Nested CounterfactualsItem.9:
14. Since (7)Nested CounterfactualsItem.10 is a backtracking counterfactual-the consequent occurs before the second antecedent-Lange argues it has no truth value. While I still consider this a cost of his view, since (7)Nested CounterfactualsItem.10 sounds false, not truth-valueless, it will not be of any help with (8)Nested CounterfactualsItem.11, which is not backtracking.
14 (5") Suppose the doctor gave the patient arsenic, then here's a counterfactual that would be true: if the patient had lived, then the doctor would be famous for discovering that arsenic doesn't always kill human beings.
(6") Suppose the earth were twice as massive, then here's a counterfactual that would be true: if the moon's orbit were the same, gravity would not hold. On such an account, evaluating counterfactuals requires a kind of world-hopping tour.
We begin at the actual world, then go to the closest first-antecendent world, for instance, the closest world where the doctor gives the patient arsenic. Next, we go to the closest second-antecedent world, from the first-antecedent world, namely, the closest world where the patient lives. Finally, we check whether the consequent is true or false in the final world, i.e. to see whether or not the doctor is famous for discovering that arsenic doesn't always kill human beings. It is arguable that, with the right closeness metric, a world where the doctor is mistaken about injecting arsenic is closer to the world where the doctor injects arsenic than a world where arsenic doesn't always kill human beings.
Therefore, the whole nested counterfactual is false, and Lange's prediction is borne out.
But, there are two problems with this option. First, Lange (2009, 198) says that he does not want to commit himself to this picture. He claims that such talk is merely a "metaphor" and uses scare quotes when he says, "the 'metric' determining the 'closest possible world' where that antecedent obtains." And it would be a mistake to lean too heavily on a metaphor when evaluating the metaphysical plausibility of Lange's theory.
The second problem is that, though it is tempting to use the theoretical structure of a semantic theory to inform our intuitions about which counterfactual sentences are true, such a use misunderstands the point of a semantic theory, which is merely to capture common usage. A semantic theory should not be in the business of determining usage.
Semantic theories are evaluated by how well they predict linguistic data; they should not generate linguistic data. Therefore, taking our pre-theoretic intuitions about such sentences seriously, and unless Lange can say more about what 'thinking carefully'
amounts to in such cases, we have every reason to think that (5')CounterfactsItem.14, (6)Nested CounterfactualsItem.9, (7)Nested CounterfactualsItem.10, and (8)Nested
CounterfactualsItem.11 are counterexamples to (NP).
Counterfacts
If I am right and Lange's account cannot answer these objections, there is one final retreat available. We could give up on counterfactual sentences and counterfactual propositions in favor of ontologically primitive counterfacts. While Lange posits these entities as truthmakers for counterfactual propositions, the above counterexamples show that he must make a choice: either the counterfacts ground the counterfactuals, or they ground the laws, but not both. To see this, recall the true counterfactual:
(11)CounterfactsItem.17. Thus, if we are positing counterfacts to ground the laws of nature, they cannot also be truthmakers for counterfactual propositions. To avoid confusion, I will reserve the term "counterfact" and square brackets for the truthmakers of counterfactual propositions, and use the term "Lange-fact" and angle brackets for the ontological ground of the laws.
Once we have disconnected the Lange-facts from counterfactual sentences and propositions, we see that there can be no objections to the view based on our intuitions about counterfactual sentences or propositions. Thus, it doesn't matter that the following is true: "If the doctor had given the patient arsenic, then if the patient had lived, then the doctor would be famous for discovering that arsenic doesn't always kill human beings,"
because the following Lange-fact can still obtain: If the doctor had given the patient arsenic, then if the patient had lived, then the doctor would NOT be famous for discovering that arsenic doesn't always kill human beings .
We can formulate a revised nomic preservation for the Lange-facts, according to which the laws are states of affairs that obtain in the world, M, rather than law-statements or law-propositions.
(NPC) M is a law if and only if for any P that is possibly co-instantiated with all of the laws (taken together), the Lange-fact P M obtains.
As far as I can tell, such an account is clear and consistent. Nevertheless, we should strive for more than clarity and consistency when grounding the laws of nature. I have argued that Lange-facts bear no relation to counterfactual sentences or propositions, so we cannot use our "great confidence" in counterfactual facts to help us determine the Lange-facts, which makes them awfully mysterious. And, since the Lange-facts are primitive, there is no further story to tell about them. In the end, such a theory would be plausible only if the Lange-facts were simpler or more explanatory than the laws they were postulated to ground.
But, this does not seem to be the case. There are many unanswered questions about them. 16 For instance, is there a distinct Lange-fact for every possible co-instantiated state of affairs? Do the Lange-facts bear any logical relations to one another, and if so, what are they? Lange gestures toward answers to these questions. But much more needs to be said in order to make the Lange-facts stand on their own, since on this particular formulation, they are independent of the counterfactuals. Consequently, our only access to which Lange-facts obtain and which do not is via the laws of nature.
Lange rightly points out, "That we figure out which counterfactuals are true by consulting what we already know about the laws (among other things) does not at all support the idea that the truths about the laws are ontologically prior to the subjunctive truths." (2009, 136, original emphasis) . But, as I have argued, on this final view, the only access we could have to primitive Lange-facts is through the laws of nature making them an ontological extravagance. If the Lange-facts have no theoretical virtues, but add a significant ontological cost, we should not accept them.
16. For more on these questions, see Loewer (2011) .
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Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that, because of context sensitivity, Lange cannot characterize his view of lawhood in terms of stable sets of counterfactual sentences. I have also argued that his account predicts the wrong results for many nested counterfactuals. I conclude that the laws of nature cannot depend on stable sets of counterfactuals, whether construed as sentences, the option he endorses, or alternatively, as propositions or primitive facts.
While I agree with Lange that there are some important connections between laws and counterfactuals, I think he is wrong about what those connections are.
